Piece II: A “Proof By Contradiction” for the Human Mind as a Linguistic Structure
I begin by assuming: the mind can *not* be understood as a linguistic structure.
From this, we must conclude that either the mind “accesses” (experiences, sees, encompasses, knows, appreciates, fondles) the external world *directly*, or that it accesses the world *indirectly* via some paradigm other than linguistics.
After consideration, I believe there is “no cheese” down the second tunnel. No matter what other paradigm you choose, it can be reformulated as a linguistic paradigm. So I will conclude that the mind accesses the world directly.
If the mind accesses the world directly, that is, has a direct experience of reality, then there must be some direct physical interplay between reality and mind. The “things” in reality must make themselves known by supplying their attributes to the mind via some direct exchange of communication.
I shall rely upon the cybernetic “proof” that communication necessarily requires an exchange of energy between the “source” and “receiver” of communication. Therefore, there is an exchange of energy (change of energy states) between thing and mind that mediates communication of the thing's attributes (mass, color, size, speed, etc.).
We have evidence that this really occurs. The most obvious example is light, which by experiencing an energy change at the thing, then entering our eyes and depositing its energy there, provides us with knowledge of the outside world (the thing).
But this energy transfer does not directly impinge on “mind”, but rather on specialized sensory cells, that translate their new energy states into neural signals that go to the brain. Therein, we may assume the “mind” receives the signals and uses them to reconstruct the information provided by the light, that is, to reconstruct the “thing” that affected the light in the first place.
This sounds pretty good, so far. With only mechanical transfers of energy and mechanical (neural) signals as intermediaries, we have “mind” directly accessing the external reality. By this I mean, the “mind” can reconstruct a duplicate of the external reality. So, everything “out there” has its reconstruction, its image, “in there”. And every image in the mind has its reality counterpart “out there”.
What about “Honor”? Without question, there is an image in the mind, a concept, a “knowing” of this thing called “honor”. Where in the external world is the “thing” that corresponds to “honor”? We can't find any such thing. We conclude that there is no “thing” in the external world that corresponds to our clear mental image of “honor”. Then to *what* does the image of “honor” correspond, if not to an external reality? (In place of “honor”, I could just have easily used “love”, “beauty”, “justice” or a hundred other such words.)
We are forced to conclude that the mind has constructed (not 're-'constructed!) images that have no physical, reality counterparts. A search of our minds and their contents reveals that a significant portion, perhaps even a majority of our concepts, have *no* external reality counterparts!
This begs the question, out of *what* does the mind duplicate reality? And even more specifically, out of *what* does the mind construct concepts with no external counterpart? With no external thing to *cause* these images to exist, how do they get created? And for all our mental images, out of *what* are they made?
Well, signals between brain cells, and information stored within the cells chemically. But *what* does a (hypothetical) molecule of 2,5,6-benzylpheromone-alpha-3-methyl-RNA in a brain cell *
mean*? What does a burst of “12,7,pause,3,9,15” neural impulses between two brain cells (or groups of cells) *
mean*?
We must assume that they form a code which
means something. That meaning (the original meaning of the things and events in the external reality) can be reconstructed in the mind by considering these molecules and these signals to be some sort of code. We can even assume that the code is so complex we will never understand it.
Fair enough, but *what* is a code? It's a relationship between “icons” and assigned meanings. The icons can be dots and dashes (Morse code), numerals, words, molecules in a cell or bursts of events like neuron firings. And the meanings are... No, we cannot say that meanings are yet another set of signals or events-- that just postpones the inevitable.
What are “meanings”? I will leave that for the time being.
But let's return to our question, what is a code? There's no way you can avoid the conclusion that if a code is a relationship between “icons” and “meanings” (whatever *those* are!--and yet we *KNOW* what they are in our minds, don't we???) then what a code is ... is a linguistic structure. Meanings can *only* be expressed in linguistic terms. A meaning has no other attributes other than itself, and it consists entirely of linguistic elements. A code correlates icons to linguistic elements, therefore is a linguistic structure.
Okay. So, the reconstruction of external reality in our minds is built out of a linguistic structure (icons/meanings). But that doesn't mean that the *mind* itself is constructed out of linguistic structures, does it?
Hey! We think and we consider and we are aware and even aware of ourselves, and we ponder and are aware of ourselves pondering, and *none* of that involves those linguistic structures out of which the external reality is built--does it?
Well, consider the question above. Think about how you think. Is your mind part of the “external reality”? NO! It's ... it's “internal”! Internal to what? Your skull? Your brain? Is *my* mind a part of *your* external reality? Well, of course it is. Do we have any reason to believe that your mind (out of 6 billion) is special and is the only one *not* part of your external reality?
No, we don't.
When your mind is thinking about your mind, then it constructs a mental image of itself out of the very linguistic structures that it uses to construct everything else.
Now, is that constructed mind the same mind with which you do your thinking? You say no. I ask you to describe any part of your mind that is not. You tell me. In so doing you construct that part out of linguistic structures. We can keep this up without end, you claiming that some part of your mind is not made up of linguistic structures, but you image that part in your mind with linguistic structures to even be able to think of it.
Okay, you say, I'll get around all this linguistic stuff--I'll just image in my mind a rainbow over a lovely forest--no words, just pictures. To which I respond, how do you know that's a rainbow? How did you conjure the image? Better yet, *why* did you conjure it? Did not the word “rainbow” *
precede* the image? And even as you imaged it, didn't you *
know* it was a “rainbow”--weren't you automatically *
identifying* it? And how can you “identify” something without linguistic processes? You cannot.
“Identity” has meaning only within linguistics. To establish any connection between the rainbow image and the word “rainbow” requires a linguistic structure.
I conclude: without linguistic structures, there is no part of your mind that you can describe, consider, ponder or even *
use*.
I conclude: without linguistic structures, there would be no way to encode concepts (like honor) that have no external counterparts in reality.
I conclude: without linguistic structures, there is no way to assign or incorporate “meaning” to the (for all appearances) random and/or chaotic firing of our brain cells.
I conclude: that without linguistic structures, the mind itself cannot assign or correlate meanings to even those images in the mind that *are* directly reconstructed from the external reality.
To even think to yourself: “nonsense! this is all poppycock!” is to construct, exercise, manipulate, and transform linguistic structures (icons/meanings) within the brain. I assert, that while you are thinking the above thought, *nothing* else is occuring within your brain (the flow of blood, I believe, is irrelevant here), except for the the neural activity associated with the mind's linguistic structures. There is nothing going on that is *not* linguistic structure activity. (Unless, of course, you fall pray to some strong emotion or bodily function!
)
Therefore the mind doesn't merely *use* linguistic structures, it *
IS* linguistic structures. This *contradicts* the initial assumption of my argument.
Therefore, the Human mind *
must* be looked upon as essentially linguistic in nature. {pant, pant, pant}
