Quote:
Originally Posted by ldsoftwaresteve
Although, the implication is that we DO know something about the ontological elements: they are used to build epistemological constructs.
|
Well, yes we do know that. And how is it that we know that? We know that because you and I (and apparently Qfwfq) agree that ontological elements are the building blocks of epistemological constructs: i.e., it is now a certified “rational statement” (within this group) and can be used in further deductions as if it were a fact without endangering the rationality of the discussion.
This brings up the issue of “truth by definition”. Unless a definition can be shown to be inconsistent with itself or earlier definitions, it can be held as a rational assertion and likewise used in deductions as if it were a fact. This is a simple consequence of the fact that a definition is little more than a symbolic substitution for concepts already accepted as rational.
Quote:
Originally Posted by ldsoftwaresteve
We just can't describe them using something lower down in the food chain because we are assuming they are at the bottom of it. And that's another thing we know about them.
|
I am presuming that is no more than a statement of the form, “we know we don't know” which of course is the basis of this analysis.
Quote:
Originally Posted by ldsoftwaresteve
And that there is a finite number of them and that there might be more than one.
|
I hate to be picky but the issue is that any epistemological construct must be built upon knowledge of a finite number of valid ontological elements, not that “there IS a finite number of them”. Furthermore, both zero and one are “finite numbers”, in fact the assumption of “zero” is what is meant by the concept of “solipsism” so solipsism is included in this analysis.
Except for my complaints above (which I suspect are rather trivial), I find your responses to be rational. So I will continue.
Notice that above I have used the term “valid ontological elements”. Since I have added an adjective, I need to specify exactly what that adjective is supposed to indicate. I define “reality” to be the complete set of “valid ontological elements”. Clearly there are two problems with that definition. First, it is meaningful only internal to itself (it is tautological in nature) and second there clearly exists no way of determining whether a particular ontological element is indeed a member of the set; however, it does posses one significant characteristic not possessed by ontological elements which are not members of that set. That characteristic is that all flaw free epistemological constructs must explain those particular elements whereas there can exist other ontological elements which are part and parcel of the epistemological construct itself: and might not exist in an alternate construct.
And I have now introduced another concept: a “flaw free epistemological construct”. This concept is central to my exposition as I am not at all concerned with generating epistemological constructs but rather with discovering the inherent constraints on such things. Thus it is that I will presume that the only epistemological constructs of interest to us are “flaw free”: i.e., there exists no known information which will invalidate them. (If known information exists which invalidates them, that is a search problem: i.e., it is the job of researchers to discover the flaws and such a discovery simply removes the epistemological construct from our interest).
The only epistemological constructs of interest here are thus totally flaw free.
Are we still in agreement? -- Dick
