Science Forums 2

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick:

I hate to be picky but the issue is that any epistemological construct must be built upon knowledge of a finite number of valid ontological elements, not that “there IS a finite number of them”. Furthermore, both zero and one are “finite numbers”, in fact the assumption of “zero” is what is meant by the concept of “solipsism” so solipsism is included in this analysis.

Are you including zero in this to allow for the fact that our constructs can be false?

Notice that above I have used the term “valid ontological elements”. Since I have added an adjective, I need to specify exactly what that adjective is supposed to indicate. I define “reality” to be the complete set of “valid ontological elements”. Clearly there are two problems with that definition.

My dear friend, 'clearly' is not a word I would use here.
My clarity isn't equal to yours. My mind is racing trying to put boundaries on what you've said. Now if I substitute 'things that can be sensed' with 'ontological elements' it clears it up a little. If I allow that I might not be able to sense all ontological elements in reality, that clears it up a little bit more. Are you okay with that? That gives me a first hand connection to the concept.

First, it is meaningful only internal to itself (it is tautological in nature)

..... you just slipped 'meaningful' into the conversation and I have a lot of baggage with that term. That implies (to me) a living thing, since it is only to a living thing that meaning applies. Therefore, you have given

I define “reality” to be the complete set of “valid ontological elements”."

implied life. Now it is clear (I almost used the word 'true') that since it is a construct of yours, and that it has meaning to you (and if I comprehend it, me too) that you are the reason it has life.

and second there clearly exists no way of determining whether a particular ontological element is indeed a member of the set;

To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, "I determine it thus! (he kicks the tree)".

however, it does posses one significant characteristic not possessed by ontological elements which are not members of that set. That characteristic is that all flaw free epistemological constructs must explain those particular elements

Ah, I'm having a referential moment. "Brothers and sisters have I none, this man's father is my father's son". Your ability to skewer a referent and hold it in place is masterful. Unfortunately, with me, it's like trying to pick up a drop of water with my fingertip.

"All flaw free epistemological constructs must explain those particular elements".

And there is the connection to explanation. So, in short, an epistemological construct is an explanation in the abstract sense. I'm looking at the explanation itself, not at the thing it is explaining. Yes, and I think this is what drove you to explain it in mathematical terms.

whereas there can exist other ontological elements which are part and parcel of the epistemological construct itself: and might not exist in an alternate construct.

I suspect that my failure to understand this can be explained by my previous confusion. Keep in mind Dick that you arrived at these observations over time. In addition, did you ever see the cartoon character "wrongway peachfuzz"? He was ship's captain that did not know the meaning of the term, 'straight line'. Well, thing of him as me.

And I have now introduced another concept: a “flaw free epistemological construct”. This concept is central to my exposition as I am not at all concerned with generating epistemological constructs but rather with discovering the inherent constraints on such things.

This really is the nut of the whole thing, isn't it?

Ok. So, the meaningful thing to you here is to 'discover the inherent constraints on epistemological contructs'. And you want to use only constructs with a 'white plume' (Thank you Cyrano) in your exploration. That makes sense.

Thus it is that I will presume that the only epistemological constructs of interest to us are “flaw free”: i.e., there exists no known information which will invalidate them.
The only epistemological constructs of interest here are thus totally flaw free

Ok. I'm not far enough off the ground that I'd get hurt with that.