Science Forums 2

[modest]

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Well, here I think I need to probe little bit to see where you stand.

Even if there is one "correct" way to define time and space - i.e. correct in that it perfectly coincides with the way time and space are metaphysically - do you think we would be able to find out? Considering that each definition contains a lot of unobservable features. (Note here that I include the ontological assumptions as part of our "definition of time and space")

Do you think it can be ontologically valid to identify some patterns ("objects") of reality as "ontologically same" from one moment to the next? (any definition of space requires you to do this for many patterns)
If it can be valid, do you think we could find out whether our definitions happen to coincide with some "ontological identity of things"?

You may be still using the word "ontology" differently than I do, and I may be reading you wrong, but it does seem to me like there are quite a few naive realistic assumptions in your thinking. So I thought I should remind you that my perspective on this is that the worldview - where the definitions for time & space exist - is something that is used to interpret a "data stream". I.e. the data coming from sensory organs is not metaphysically pictures and sounds; it's data to be interpreted as pictures and sounds (according to what the meaning of our sensory data is believed to be). Any aspect of that interpretation that you take as ontologically real amounts to a belief.

Hence any definition of space has to do with how some patterns have been identified in that stream. Whatever "space" means is largely a semantical issue.

As an interesting side note, all human communication includes a component of ambiguity exactly because of this reason; we all interpret each others according to our very own worldview... ...human communication becomes very tricky when we don't share the same paradigms. We are often so convinced of the validity of our own worldview that we don't think it's even possible to interpret the other person intelligibly... Like Kuhn said, one paradigm cannot be investigated from another.

Additionally I should mention that DD's epistemological analysis has to do with that same perspective; that we do not know anything about reality, but somehow we infer the meaning from completely unknown data. The investigation of "how that data can be modelled" has to do with certain symmetries that must exist in our view on that data exactly because we do not know what is its "ontological origin", so to speak. Certain interesting requirements for our models of time and space arise.

Admittedly this is somewhat tricky issue to communicate clearly when the other party is using different terminology and looks at reality somewhat differently. It's kind of like trying to explain to someone pre-Newton how a spaceship from Earth to Mars cannot really be said to "fly through space", apart from our conception of the situation. Certainly that person would take that assertion as clearly invalid, since he can clearly see the spaceship flying through space... ...the point is to concentrate on what semantical matters there exists. Like, is it Mars flying through space rather than the spaceship? And then to realize just what do we mean by "space" and what does it mean to "fly through it" etc... To see just to what extent human definitions give rise to our conception of reality.

The reality of time has one real form. Otherwise, it is logically inconsistent. Your rebuttal is that different people have different interpretations of time and you give a long description of how this is so. Did I say otherwise? You’re both off topic to the subject of the thread and my post that you’re responding to.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

You can make a multitude of ontological intepretations that conform to the predictable observations, because here the ontological interpretations are the assumptions regarding what happens behind our observations. Just like is the case with the different interpretations of QM.

The assumption that reality is a static spacetime block is just one interpretation.

Another would be that reality does not exist in any definite "now-state" before it is being observed.

Or one could imagine each inertial frame is part of a multiverse, i.e. we switch to a different "space" (where the "now"-states really exist differently from each others)

I would imagine, that in the middle of assumptions as far fetched as any of the above, one would be somewhat motivated to investigate the possibility that relativistic time relationships arise from our ways of defining reality rather than from these ontological options. I.e. take a look at that epistemological analysis.

Philosophy is part of science and is not immune to the dictums therein held. Minkowski’s ideas of space and time make useful predictions of the future. As such it has value past any description you just managed. So far your only objection to the current standard definition of space and time as dimensions is that other less useful interpretations exist. You apparently don’t want to advocate any of those - you’re just pointing out that they’re there.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I said it is a semantical issue what is considered a variable and what is considered "law of physics". We created the definitions that lead us to such and such laws for those semantically defined entities. I think your comment "you are confusing variables with laws of physics" just shows that you assume the "laws of physics" and "parameters" are ontologically real, embedded somewhere in metaphysical reality rather looking at them as "tools of predicting reality".

Once again, philosophy is not immune. If you want to rearrange the laws of physics and fundamental variables that get put in them then go ahead. If it is consistent like our current understanding and makes similar or better predictions then I’m all for it. Otherwise what are you saying?

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Do you really think I was claiming that time dilation does not happen? I was just saying that in order for us to understand something as "time dilation", we had to define quite a few things in our worldview that way, and that there are always many possible paradigms that we could use the understand the same situation. Both would be just as valid predictionwise, and neither can be defended to be more real ontologically.

Yes, in order to understand time dilation we have to put some constraints on time. One obvious one is that time is real. But, there are others like time and space are intertwined. I’m not saying it is impossible to find differing interpretations of space and time. I’m saying we know a lot about the universe that would make many of those interpretations inconsistent - logically inconsistent. So, you can point out all day that other views of time exist - but until you present one that is consistent with the laws of physics that have been confirmed there is no particular argument you’re making.

Originally Posted by modest

Relativity is not a model. I normally wouldn't correct that, but it's important in the context of this discussion.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Interesting; I would have said the exact opposite for the exact same reason; in the context of this discussion is important to understand just how relativity is a model. Perhaps I don't understand how you mean your assertion, or perhaps you have a naive realistic view on relativity. Well, in any case it would be interesting to know whether you abide to the "static spacetime block" view of relativity, or whether you have even thought about what reality might look like behind the math?

Perhaps it is helpful to know that I am coming at this largely from the angle of General Semantics;
General semantics - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Also I noticed the Wikipedia page for "Metaphysics" includes "Space and time" section which includes metaphysical questions of space that just reveal some of those semantical aspects regarding how we understand time and space;
Metaphysics - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I skipped few things because I didn't think they were very relevant. If you want a comment on something I've skipped, just ask.

-Anssi

Model and theory are precisely defined in science. Relativity is a theory.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Physics is different from ontology. I think you are missing slightly the topic of this discussion when you bring in absolutely standard definitions of standard physics models.

And you are missing the point that physics is one of the best tools ontology has.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

The discussion is about what is reality like; what is it that makes those physics models valid.

You wonder why I’m bringing up physics when you say we are trying to figure out what makes physics models valid. Humm...

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Validity of a model means here that it produces correct predictions. The same observable predictions can always be achieved through different assumptions about unobservable reality (and different classification of the observable reality). But you keep insisting "time" is fundamental because you see it in our physics definitions. Other people are discussing what is it in our knowledge that allowed us to define something like "time" in our physics models.

I’m sorry, clearly the fact that all of science is built on the fundamental assumption that time is more fundamental than movement has absolutely no relevance to the topic of which is more fundamental

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Likewise, nothing can move without change. That is what ldSoftwareSteve was saying. The idea being that things change in our experience, and therefore a definition of time is sensical and can yield (together with identifying "objects") a valid predictive model of reality.

Either change is completely synonymous with movement in which case it has brought nothing to the table or it is different and no one has yet defined it. Either way there is no substantive argument here. Not in ontology nor in epistemology nor in any endeavor of science or reality. This is obvious and your objection is entirely based on the fact that I'm the one saying it.

I understand what softwaresteve is saying. I’ve seen that surface scratched many times. I’ve never seen where it’s going...

Originally Posted by AnssiH

That is, it is not really invalid when Modest says "time" is required by the physics models and without it motion could not be described. It is required by the physics models, but that does not mean reality works that way. You can take "motion" or "change" as fundamental (=without cause) property of reality, albeit you are not really able to defend this (and why that is so, should be pretty clear if you think about how we conceive anything in reality)

Likewise, it is not really invalid when ldSoftwareSteve says "change" gives rise to the definitions of "motion" and "time", when you talk about how do we come about perceiving reality the way we do.

You guys see how you are talking slightly next to each others?

On the contrary, you’ve just twisted steve’s point and my point into your own reasoning. For instance, when I say “no example can be given otherwise”, I’m not talking about physics models (nor theories nor laws). And, when steve says there are two kinds of change, he’s not talking about what you’re talking about. Every post you (probably inadvertently) steer the discussion into your ideas of expectations of reality. I understand why that is, but you might consider there are alternative methods and ideas that are in fact more historically useful than the concepts you continue reiterating.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Like I mentioned before, the definitions of DD's epistemological analysis have got "changes" (to the undefined data) underlying concepts like "motion" and "time". But that is not an assertion about reality; it is just an assertion about our knowledge; We cannot really investigate objectively what is the underlying cause of the changes in that data, as we can only investigate that matter through the model we have built according to that data. It is important to note the word "model", because in that data by itself there are not explicit "objects" that "move".

Yes, I’ve followed DD’s theory for some time now and, again, I know exactly where you’re coming from.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Yeah exactly, but also other way around, it doesn't really matter how ugly your description of reality is; if it makes correct predictions for the future it is valid. I have hard time understanding why some physicist comment that string theory, since it seems to have only unobservable properties differing from older physics models, is merely a philosophical bastardization of those old models. That implies that those physicist believe the old models somehow have ontological truth to them more than string theory.

On the contrary, it implies that string theory may not have any basis in reality. Multiple string theories have made identical predictions with different theoretical structure. Which is correct to reality? None make any useful predictions that can yet be tested so they are all outside the valid definition of scientific theory. String theory makes more assumptions about reality than the standard model.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Well, both models yield same predictions; it would be far more objective to see them both as equally valid; I really don't see how either one could somehow be closer to ontological reality than the other if they really do yield exactly the same observable predictions. I see the arguments for and against equally valid models as the same as people arguing whether everything moves by invisible fairies carrying them or is it rather invisible elves. Neither can be said to be ontologically valid apart from simply believing so.

(Note btw how the definitions of string theory are also suddenly seen as ontologically real... "Reality has got 11 dimensions" etc... Ehh.... that's part of the definitions of the model, it means it is valid to model reality with such and such number of dimensions, but it doesn't mean suddently that is somehow ontologically valid. Who defined reality before we did? God? Don't think so)

To question the ontology of the standard model is questioning the existence of fundamental particles like electrons and photons. To question string theory is questioning strings. It’s in fact not even correct to say that both string theory and the standard model can’t both be right. They may well be. Would you say newton’s laws of gravity and Einstein’s GR can’t both be right? Yes, they can both be right and your description above is wrong.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

That is also semantics. One can conceive a situation where one particle disappears and another appears. Is that better described as "movement" or "change"? And who cares? More interesting is that you can also say quite confidently that there's no example of movement that didn't require change. Just, in a nutshell, we are not talking about how specific concepts are defined in specific physics models, but how do we come about defining any concepts at all, in ANY possible valid models.

It could be you don't see it reasonable at all to investigate epistemological issues behind our valid models, but I think it is reasonable already for the reason that it forces you to think about your models more objectively. It is like General Semantics in that it forces you to perform some mental hygiene; it forces you to classify certain features of your reality as semantical of nature, and certain features as objective logic. It makes you less prone to make arguments that are purely based on belief. You need belief in your everyday conception of reality, but not in your assertions about how reality is or what is "fundamental" (whatever "fundamental" means)

Yeah, just keep pointing out that there are different possible interpretations. Don’t give any examples or show how my interpretation is wrong. Your argument is equivalent to saying: You’re wrong because you could be wrong. What am I supposed to do with that?

Originally Posted by AnssiH

...it makes you less prone to make assertions like this. For someone coming into this discussion and not knowing you are referring to standard physics models rather than ontological reality when you say that, they would immediately assume you think that time is an ontological dimension, like a static canvas where future and past exists all the time and that you assume only your consciousness moves through that time.

Ok, take your paints back over to your canvas and paint your own picture. So far, it’s blank and I’m quite happy with mine.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I doubt you see things that way, I can only assume you don't see ontological considerations of spacetime as reasonable at all? Since you know it is called Minkowski spacetime, I assume you also know that Einstein was not thinking in terms of spacetime at all when he put out the first papers of Special Relativity. That interpretation arose later. Have you thought what other interpretations are possible?

What other interpretations are possible?

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Did you read the "An unorthodox view on relativity" thread? It would be interesting to hear what you think about it. (I think I have provided enough material about ontological perspective of this for you to understand that predictionwise validity of relativity is not questioned at all)

http://hypography.com/forums/philoso...elativity.html

Yes, I have. And you’re absolutely correct - this discussion belongs there.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Absolutely not. Physics is different from ontology and they should not be confused with each others. Valid model makes correct predictions in terms of things have been defined by them

Physics does a fine job of informing us of ontology.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

No, but objectively thinking, we should not assume any ontological reality to them either. An axiom is "true" within the model itself; it can be part of a valid (=makes correct predictions) and self-coherent worldview.

(I'm just jumping in here because it is clear you are dismissing many arguments by forgetting the difference between ontology and valid models)

Oh, I get why you’re jumping in here. I also can spot a “model” that makes no predictions. By the way, you like that word ‘model’ don’t you?

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Gravity is a good example because there exist many valid ways to model it and those valid ways can be interpreted ontologically differently. Objectively thinking, we should not make any assumptions as to the ontological reality behind the phenomenon we call "gravity". In that sense it is in fact somewhat wrong to say "gravity is ontologically real", since it is possible to model reality without ever invoking the idea of "gravity" as anything by itself; in general relativity for example, it is just a side effect of how "matter" and "spacetime" interact. i.e. just a name for some pattern we see.

I should mention also that seeing something "under the microscope" doesn't yield its ontological reality because we see reality the way we conceive it in our minds.

How we ‘model’ gravity in the ‘theory’ of general relativity doesn’t make it any less real. If mass curves spacetime and we see attraction between masses then gravity refers to that curved spacetime. Did you miss my point that there are real processes of the universe that we can’t touch?

Originally Posted by AnssiH

And it isn't. In my opinion it is only helpful. Mental hygiene.

I’m sure your view of reality is much better informed than Berkeley or Mach.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

This also implies you are confusing ontology and physical models. What we have is a model that predicts the future of some data. The explicit meaning of that data is not known, as the predictive model includes many arbitrary choices. That map not being the territory means exactly that; The map is a (valid) conception of the terrain.

No, this implies that you don’t know the difference between a model and a spacetime metric.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Nor are they trying to do that. Physics is different from ontology. The realization is that we are absolutey required to create mental concepts in order to conceive reality at all. That is why there's a concept of "noumena", it refers to reality before it has been classifyed as "anything" by any predictive model, and one cannot make any predictions about such form (nor can such a form be conceived mentally, because mental conception is those concepts that have been created about the data)

Trust me, it is helpful to understand that distinction. Plus, suddenly reality seems even far more beautiful than how you first conceived it

It would be good mental hygiene for philosophy to realize why it has done so poor a job of informing science. I believe it is possible for this branch of science to make wonderful contributions. Unfortunately, when the objective is not real contribution, what can the outcome be? To think that definitions of time and space are suspicious merely for coming from science and having useful application. To think we need to write a thousand word essay on alternate interpretations without presenting even one. To object to something that has stood on it’s own validity for a century without offering one counter example. That’s not science and it sure shouldn't be philosophy.

~modest