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Originally Posted by Overdog
The reason I posted that is because it seems to me the debate is being waged from points of view which are seperated by an epistimological paradigm shift.
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To quote your quote, “The Realist/Anti-Realist debate can be reduced, in the end, to a conflict of intuitions:” . This I can essentially agree with; however, I would rather not use the word “intuition”. I would much prefer the concept I define as
"squirrel thought". That is to say, the realist/Anti-Realist debate can be reduced, in the end to conflicting “squirrel constructs”. One thing which I find interesting is the fact that my presentation encompasses both possibilities: I show that the proper relationship which must be satisfied by a flaw free epistemological construct is my fundamental equation. In the deduction of that equation, the numerical references refer to the underlying ontological elements. If you were to follow my deduction carefully, you would discover that I make use of two very different ontological elements, one set would be the “valid ontological elements” (which would of course be reality itself) and the other set is purely imagined (entities dreamed up whose existence, together with my equation, would constrain the past to exactly what is observed).
It should be clear that, if the first set consists of no elements, we are speaking of an Anti-Realist construct. On the other hand, if the second set vanishes, we are speaking of a Realist construct. A central tenet in my presentation is the fact that the rules these ontological elements obey must be the same for both sets and it follows that my fundamental equation presumes that, in a flaw free epistemological construct there is simply no way to distinguish between a Realist and/or Anti-Realist construct. I am simply not part of that debate. In fact, from my perspective, such a debate does not belong in a rational discussion.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Overdog
Perhaps some insight into the philosophical underpinnings of the two perspectives would be helpful.
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The first error you make here is that you think that the discussion here has something to do with that issue. As far as I am concerned, the question being discussed is “What is time?” and that would be the definition of the concept. I give mine and everyone baulks. You all give yours and I find them consistently inadequate.
My deduction is based upon well defined opening issues and “time” is the first variable to be established. And that means established in the absence of any knowledge about that “valid epistemological construct” we are interested in discovering. Everyone else argues about what kind of epistemological construct should be used as a starting point. As you have pointed out
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Strict constructivists will complain that there is no way to confirm one way or another, since the goal of inquiry (Reality) must be assumed to be understood at the outset. The Realist hope, in a constructivist view, is simply to arbitrarily freeze the infinite circularity that plagues human reasoning which vainly hopes to validate itself with a secure foundation.
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Thus the argument you are all trying to settle is totally and completely beside the point. The “infinite circularity” can be solved in only one way.
Take the fundamental ontological elements as “unknowns” and see what can be said
Without Any Epistemological Starting Point. Everyone, to every last man (except perhaps Anssi) absolutely confident that such a thing cannot be done which makes it perfectly obvious that I could not possibly have accomplished anything via the approach I have claimed. Thus they either ignore what I say or they waste all their time trying to figure out what my underlying epistemological starting point is: i.e., what you are calling the philosophical underpinnings of my perspective. The philosophical underpinnings of my perspective is that logic can be understood if an effort is made.
Don't start by looking at my conclusions and arguing that they aren't consistent with your world view. At the moment, on this very forum, I have taken the issue all the way to deducing Schroedinger's equation which most everyone knows implies Newtonian mechanics is approximately correct, To say that my conclusions aren't consistent with your world view is to say that, in your world view, Newtonian mechanics is not approximately correct. One should start with my original presentation and show a logical step which you believe to be erroneous. Any other approach to the issue is utterly unproductive.
The first step is simple beyond belief: any epistemological construct is based upon some collection of ontological elements. One can use numerical labels to refer to these ontological elements (thus avoiding the ambiguities inherent in using any defined “language”). Any “flaw free” epistemological solution provides you with a method of getting from this collection of ontological elements to your expectations as expressed in terms of these ontological elements. If that construct is flaw free, those expectation must be perfectly consistent with what you know. (Hey, there is my definition of “the past”). Finally, your expectation can certainly be expressed as a number bounded by zero and one which denotes the probability your expectation say should be attached to a particular set of ontological elements used to express that particular expectation.
And believe it or not, that makes your expectations a mathematical function. If you have expectations, then that mathematical function exists!
Am I a realist or an anti-realist? Does that question have any bearing at all on what I have just said?
Have fun -- Dick
