I was not sure if I should reply to this thread or not, because it has proven to be such a hard issue to communicate clearly enough. It's far too easy to misinterpret what is being said, and I see a lot of "groping among mere concepts" already... Decided to give it a go anyway, especially as this is critically related to what Doctordick is talking about. I think if you can wrap your head around what Korzybski was really saying, you can understand what DD is doing.
So I guess I should being with the "map-territory relationship". Some confusion seems to exist as to what Korzybski meant exactly. Pyrotex is close, but there are few critical clarifications that I need to make.
The map-territory relationship refers to the fact that our comprehension of reality contains purely epistemological facets that cannot be considered part of ontological reality. The "map" constitutes a language by which we make sense of (sensory) data, whose ontological meaning is unknown.
The map is essentially the human made definitions for certain patterns. I.e. such and such data pattern means "a cliff", etc.
So the difference between "the map" and "the territory" does not refer to something like "the location of a cliff". If you had a map which had the cliff located in wrong place, that would still be a map which works in terms of "cliffs" or "solid matter" and "space" etc.
The difference between the map and the territory refers to the fact that devoid of "sensible human definitions", the raw form of reality is unintelligible. And any intelligible form contains human definitions. That is why "the map is not the territory".
So think of it this way, the territory is the undefined form of reality (it is the form you cannot "think of"), and the map is the set of defined entities and concepts that offers a way to predict that data in meaningful way. It is always possible to build many very different kinds of maps that explain the same exact raw data; they merely explain it using completely different terminology.
Every map that could ever exist operates on certain entities or concepts being seen as "fundamentally real", or as "ontological elements". For example, back in the days world used to be built out of "Fire", "Air", "Earth", "Water" and "Void". Those were the only "real" elements, the rest was combinations of. And for example "friction" and "temperature" were considered to be "real" properties of "matter", but now they are seen as entirely human definitions on such and such type of "motion".
If you look at this issue closely, you can realize that all facets of reality (including "motion") that you can think of, are understood in terms of some human definitions.
If you feel like saying "But I can feel the tennis ball in my hand, surely that is not just a human definition!", you just did not understand what Korzybski said, and you are still clinging on naive realistic view of reality. (Don't jump to conclude that the alternative is any form of idealism, it is not)
The comprehension of "a tennis ball in my hand" is a result of a map which contains a definition for a "tennis ball" and "my hand", and the expected interaction between the two. Even though the ball does not fall through your hand, those things are not to be considered ontologically "solid things". The physics explanation of today is already an explanation of specific interaction between the atoms of the ball and the hand. The atoms themselves are not "solid" (just like they are not "slippery" or "hot"). The atom does not have an ontological "wall" to itself, unless you form some very specific (arbitrary) definition and device an appropriate way to measure the location of that "wall".
Likewise the atom does not even "look" like anything, as the physics definition is that an electron gives off an photon, which causes a reaction in the eye etc... The nucleus does not give photons, so what does it look like? The electron that gives off a photon cannot be seen either; you just see the photon!
Likewise, nothing has got any "colour" or "shape" to it without specific definitions as to how to measure those properties with other defined entities. Different definitions give different results, simple as that.
If you actually manage to shake off your naive realistic ideas, it's quite plain to see that our ideas of what the fundamental building blocks of reality are, are formed of naive realistic ideas, and of purely arbitrary assumptions as to what constitutes an "identity" of a thing.
Also it is plain to see that absolutely any given definition gets its meaning from how it is understood against other definitions. An issue that arkain101 touched when he said
"The point I am trying to bring to light here is that there are some meanings that do no exist when all else is excluded." Think even harder and you will see that there is no "meaning" that could be understood independently from other meanings. The comprehension of one concept is dependent on the comprehension of many other concepts, which is dependent on... etc, until you come around and realize you understand the meaning of everything in circular fashion. X is true if Y is true, which is true if Z is true, which is true if X is true. Oops. The set of definitions in a map are self-supporting each others in circular and self-coherent fashion, and because we can often understand the same things through different set of self-coherent definitions, we say we understand things semantically. That is the issue General Semantics touches; everything is understood in semantical terms, i.e. self-coherent set of "truths".
Rade, you should understand that "map" is not referring to an ontological entity, nor is "mind". Mind is also something you need to form a very specific definition of inside your personal worldview, and you understand what it means in terms of very many other concepts, that you also understand in your own way. Different people understand the word "mind" very differently, and when you don't spend the time to really try and understand HOW people mean their words, you will be hopelessly "groping among mere concepts". I can honestly tell you I always put in a lot of effort to try and understand how you mean your words before I reply to you (I hope it shows), simply because you use such a different perspective on things that otherwise I could not converse meaningfully with you. I think likewise you should put in some effort to understand what is meant by map-territory relationship exactly.
Well, I guess this gets us to the definitions of "self". We all have our own idea as to what our self is. Often people tend to equate their self with the material that is their brain. On the other hand, everyone's brain is similar material and the difference is more accurately in the exact configuration between neurons. If you were to cast your current configuration onto the brain of your friend and vice versa, the subjective experience "inside your friend" would be the belief, or the semantical idea, that you switched from one body to the next. That's not ontologically right nor wrong, it's just an idea; a way to conceive the situation in a "meaningful way"; in terms of a map. If you think of this, you can see that there's no reason to suppose any ontological identity even to yourself, even though subjective experience exists. It could be said (vaguely) that it exists, because the map is of the form "these things are happening to myself"
On a related note, if you guys were able to wrap your head around the above, you might be able to understand exactly why there exists such a "paradox" as "the hard problem of consciousness", and what effectively resolves it. Can you figure it out?
If you don't know what it is:
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
So, perhaps now I can make a meaningful reply to the OP
Quote:
Originally Posted by arkain101
The question is, in scientific terms, what exists and how do we know that it does exist?
Let's discuss what exists, and how and why it does.
I believe this can be broken down into two categories.
1)What our senses can tell us exists
2)What reasoning, mathematics, and experimental data can tell us
Starting with #1, one way we can prove things exist is through our sensory capabilities. If we can see it (sight), touch it (spacial awareness), smell it (scent), feel it (texture touch), hear it (sound), taste it, then we can know that it exists. Why? I think if it can affect us, then it exists.
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There are few pitfalls with that sort of definition for "exists", because whatever you can perceive is a result of
interpreting the unknown sensory data in a very
specific way (while many alternative interpretations exist).
If you have a brain dysfunction that causes you to hear voices in your head, you might come to interpret that as a voice of god. Therefore, with the terminology of your map (your explanation of reality), "god affects you", therefore god exists?
I'm sure you'd be prone to tell such a person that it is not god that exists, but such and such dysfunction in their brain. If so, a coherent terminology requires you to say "sounds" don't exists, only air pressure fluctuations that is interpreted as sound. And not even air pressure fluctuations, but actually a specific motion of atoms that is defined as "air pressure". And not even atoms as that sort of map too is a function of a specific definition of raw sensory data! See what Korzybski was on about?
Quote:
The other is when we exclude all our sensory methods. How then can we test and define that something exists?
One could say, we know something exists if it has the ability to affect other things that exist. Say what? 
Let's try this again. What exists is, that which can have an effect on that which can have an effect on those things that produce effects on other things that have effects on others. 
If I try to describe the universe when excluding the awareness produced by senses, that is, to exclude the consciousness, I end up with trying to explain that which is not absolute. For example, Let's say I know an object exists because it can have an effect on another object. This lets us know it exists but it does not define how. Or, I know light exists because it has an effect on an atom. But why do I know that atom exists? Because it produces energy?
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I'm getting the feeling that what triggered these questions was that you started to see how things really are up to human definitions (hence such a lengthy reply of the issue).
You can't see an effect on a "thing" unless you have defined that "thing" (that such and such patterns mean there is such a "thing"). After you have defined something, and perceive it, and see an effect on it, you are free to form all sorts of hypothetical entities that are capable of explaining what you just saw, without really ever seeing that entity itself. Photons and any single "fundamental entity" you can think of is a result of a map building in exactly that manner. You cannot probe their existent apart from trying to find out whether some observable data behaves the way that such and such model of "photons" says they should. Probing reality in a meaningful way depends on first having some hypothetical model of it, giving some meaning to your probing. Your map being prediction-wise valid, is different from it being ontologically correct.
If you are willing to follow the epistemological analysis of DD (I assume you've seen it discussed around this forum), it should shed a lot of light on exactly the issues you are starting to have questions about.
-Anssi
