Preliminary remarks on the philosophy of science

[The Heretic]

I have a BA degree in philosophy, and plan on attending graduate school (where hopefully I will focus on the philosophical aspects of science in greater detail than the cursory once-over in that course in Philosophy of Science i took during my frosh year). The professor settled on the Introductory Readings in the P of Science for the textbook, and we studied about 1/5th of the readings therein.

The Usual Suspects

• Demarcation between science and pseudo-science: Popper, Feyerabend and Kitcher
• Explanation and Law: Hempel, Cartwright, Salmon and Bas van Fraasen
• Theory and Observation: Carnap, Putnam, Stace, Toulmin, and Maxwell
• Confirmation and Acceptance: Quine, Kuhn, Hempel, and Frank

Thanks to the utterly neutral professor, the class was one of the best i ever experienced in my entire college career. Left me damned hungry for more!

But let me be the first to insist that it is not necessary to know a great deal of science before engaging in a discussion about the philosophy of science. For instance, an engineering student could have a working understanding of physics and mathematics, sans the theorizing aspect, tilted heavily towards the practical applications of those theories. A specialist of science wouldn't be proficient in the philosophy of his or her own science, likely because he or she isn't likely to ever bother to examine the ground level concepts he or she already takes for granted. Them damned philosophers are more likely to dig under the ground levels and create new subterranean tunnels and basements with newly minted conceptual tools.

The ultimate difference between scientists and the philosophers of science is in their actions:

• Scientists observe what's going on, experiment or manipulate the object under observation, assert/hypothize/conjecture "laws" of nature, and incorporate those laws into theories. OTOH, P of S ask questions about the "laws," about the difference between science and non-science, and about the criteria adopted to distinguish between them.
• Scientists construct a theory and deduce other theories/laws. OTOH, P of S examine the nature of deduction by contrasting it with other types of reasoning, and describe the performance deduction has in science.

IOW, generally, science is empirical/synthetic/experimental, whereas P of science is verbal/analytic/reflective. Of course, there are overlaps that blurs this spic-and-span distinction, such as the theoretical physicists. The vocabulary found in the philosophy of science literature refers to a metalanguage that refers to the object language of science that refers to the objects/processes in the real world.

A person who has a doctorate in any field obviously has to have some working philosophy to defend in their dissertation. Whether they ever go beyond that initial defense is another ball o' wax.

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally Posted by The Heretic

But let me be the first to insist that it is not necessary to know a great deal of science before engaging in a discussion about the philosophy of science.

No, but it can help. More importantly, it's useful to know something of the history of science (or at least several key episodes - like the so-called Galileo Affair, say). That's partly why Lakatos said that "Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind." A working or thorough knowledge also increases the possibility of an imminent critique (although it isn't unachievable without).

[The Heretic]

Originally Posted by Hugo Holbling

No, but it can help. More importantly, it's useful to know something of the history of science (or at least several key episodes - like the so-called Galileo Affair, say). That's partly why Lakatos said that "Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind." A working or thorough knowledge also increases the possibility of an imminent critique (although it isn't unachievable without).

I concur. I've always been partial to immanent critiques because they do not import foreign criteria to the object of inquiry. A transcendental critique is efficient only as long as the interlocutors are already subscribing to that particular framework.

In my readings I have learned that the history of science is the best at debunking or substantiating the proffered methodologies of the philosophers. For example, an idealistic fan (say, phoenix suns) may be inclined to believe his basketball team is going to win the championship this year. But a historian of basketball might have reasons to doubt the fan's expectations, because of trends in the past indicate that running teams without size or halfcourt offense will suffer in the playoffs and are not successful.

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally Posted by The Heretic

In my readings I have learned that the history of science is the best at debunking or substantiating the proffered methodologies of the philosophers.

Aye. If a philosopher of science declares that "science proceeds in fashion x" but we find that this advice would have forced us to reject a theory in the past that - with the benefit of hindsight - we now want to keep, we have to either abandon this philosophical approach or bite the bullet and say that losing the theory would have been the right thing to do. (For example, see the discussion of special relativity here.) This is (partly) where Popper fell at the first fence - although he didn't play bball.

[Buffy]

Originally Posted by Hugo Holbling

That's partly why Lakatos said that "Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind."

Yah, its like you can't design clothes or cars without knowing both the mecanics and the history. Try putting out a car that looks like an Edsel. Or coming out with off-the-shoulder tops when you know that Anna Wintour said they were sucky back in the May, 1997 issue of Vogue?

Actually, I've always thought that the history of science was ignored by too many scientists, and now that everyone is specializing (hey the rift between the theoretical and experimental physics communities totally blows), no one's bothering to learn anything about anything else because if you haven't had your Einstein-1905 moment by the time you're 25, you might as well quit. PPPBBBBTTTT!

Heretic: you prolly get flak for specializing in Philosophy of Science--no glamour according to some I'm sure--but we're all gonna die if there aren't more of you around....

Welcome guys!

Cheers,
Buffy

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally Posted by Buffy

Actually, I've always thought that the history of science was ignored by too many scientists, and now that everyone is specializing (hey the rift between the theoretical and experimental physics communities totally blows), no one's bothering to learn anything about anything else because if you haven't had your Einstein-1905 moment by the time you're 25, you might as well quit.

Something Kuhn wrote in his much-maligned The Structure of Scientific Revolutions might interest you, then. In chapter eleven he suggested that "[t]extbooks... being pedagogical vehicles for the perpetuation of normal science, have to be rewritten in whole or in part whenever the language, problem-structure, or standards of normal science change." What he meant was that the pedagogical nature of textbooks is such that they become a function of the historical linearity that most scientists assume - i.e., that everyone was working on the same problems and that we are closer to the answers than those before us.

[sanctus]

Welcome on the forum to both of you! I look forward to read more about what you have to say about philo of science, as I only the one I'm forcely encountering during my physics studies; I'm actually taking an option called "History of QM", but that's all.

[Buffy]

Originally Posted by Hugo Holbling

Something Kuhn wrote in his much-maligned The Structure of Scientific Revolutions might interest you, then....

Oh man, I read that for my History of Science class at Berkeley *ages* ago. Yah, misunderstood, but useful...

Originally Posted by Hugo Holbling

In chapter eleven he suggested that "[t]extbooks... being pedagogical vehicles for the perpetuation of normal science, have to be rewritten in whole or in part whenever the language, problem-structure, or standards of normal science change." What he meant was that the pedagogical nature of textbooks is such that they become a function of the historical linearity that most scientists assume - i.e., that everyone was working on the same problems and that we are closer to the answers than those before us.

Its the "must be rewritten" part though that's facinating: you need to incorporate the past (Newton's "standing on the shoulder's of giants") while not throwing the baby out with the bathwater (something that happened to useful elements of Descartes writings by some of Newton's proponents).

I'll have to go back and re-read that one...

Cheers,
Buffy

[Buffy]

Okay, went back and re-read the Kuhn chapter, and the interesting point to me is that the rewriting of the text books (what we learn from) "...(are) misconstructions (that) render revolutions invisible. They also work to deny revolutions as a function." Which is what we have the history of science for, and oddly enough, that human conflict is what is interesting to the layperson, and actually counteracts this tendency to hide the conflict. I've been reading "The Newtonian Moment" (by Mordechai Feingold) on the topic of Newton's conflicts with Descartes, Leibnitz and their supporters, which although written more for people who are well versed with the history highlights the conflict and the process of that revolution. More importantly in popular culture there have been many successful attempts to bring this "human conflict of science" to light, that the scientists are forced by popular culture to incorporate into their world-view. Many we've hit on here just recently like "Inherit The Wind" on Evolution, and Bill Bryson's "A Short History..." which is *mostly* about conflict. Just like a commie to try to find a conspiracy theory....

Cheers,
Buffy

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally Posted by sanctus

I'm actually taking an option called "History of QM"...

In that case, i suggest trying to locate a copy of Max Jammer's The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (it might be expensive so try to order it from a library). It's a comprehensive philosophical study of quantum theory from an historical perspective (Jammer's other studies of concepts in physics - mass, force and space - are also fascinating). Another option you might enjoy is Pickering's Constructing Quarks.