Philosophy of Science & Metaphysics!

[Doctordick]

I was moved to write this post after considering freeztar's rather mundane response to Idsoftwaresteve's post on the “What is time?” thread. That he should complain of Idsoftwaresteve's post while ignoring the great volume of senseless ca-ca posted everywhere on most every forum on the world wide web is a rather strange idea of objectivity. There was a time, long ago, when metaphysics was a discipline central to serious academic inquiry and any serious scholarly education. Even before Aristotle defined the field he chose to call metaphysics, the study he had in mind was considered “the Queen of Science”; its issues were considered no less important than the other main formal subjects of the time: physical science, medicine, mathematics, rhetoric and, yes, poetics and music. In a sense, the great success of physical science left the other fields in want of confirmation as “hard science”. (Hard meaning intellectually defendable.)

A lot of people today interpret the phrase “outside physics” as referring to things “not explainable by physics” as some great category where logic and analytical analysis carries no weight. Instead, they should considered “outside physics” in the same sense that the foundations of a subject can not be explained within the subject itself. In this sense, metaphysics should be the study of the fundamental foundations of physics instead of the common modern interpretation that the term refers to “subjects that are beyond the physical world” such as spirits, faith, occultism and other topics which much of the scientific world has come to view as not worth the trouble of analytical exact analysis.. Though many philosophers may consider their studies to be serious attempts to answer serious questions, the modern scientific community has essentially taken the position that there is nothing to be gained by such studies. The great majority think philosophy is one great volume of senseless ca-ca and are thus not seriously concerned with discarding heaps of such ca-ca in general philosophic discussions.

I think this is a serious academic error. Our understanding of logic, mathematics and analytical analysis today far exceeds the power of the tools available to Aristotle and these tools should be brought to bear upon these metaphysical questions. I have started down that path and found easy success. The reaction of the academic world has been quite consistent: physicists say I am doing “philosophy” which is a subject outside their interest; philosophers say I am doing “mathematics” which is, of course, a subject outside their interest and mathematicians say I am doing “physics”, again, a subject outside their professional interest. Being a physicist by training, I of course side with the physicists (i.e., I am doing philosophy); however, opposed to their beliefs, I find the examination quite interesting on a professional level. Though I must admit, I fully understand the physicists lack of interest (he has too many important things to do with his time). What I don't understand is the philosopher's lack of interest in analytical analysis. Of the three mentioned above, he is the one who seems to have dropped the ball here.

I have come to the conclusion that we owe this massive lack of interest to the great work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). To quote from Hywel William's “Cassell's Chronology of World History” (page 334),

His “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781) and the “Critique of Practical Reason (1788) are the foundation stones of modern philosophy.

Kant shows that the categories of space and time determine the way our minds work. They also equip us to understand the world, for those categories are basic to natural order as well as being the organizing principals of our minds, linking ourselves with the world we inhabit. The truth is what makes knowledge possible but anything that lies beyond those categories cannot be described in any meaningful way. Kant's philosophy therefore abandons traditional metaphysics and closes down a whole tradition of Western thought.

The publication essentially asserts that Kant held that, ”anything that lies beyond those categories [which of course are space and time] cannot be described in any meaningful way.” An assertion such as that cannot be defended as his only support is the fact that “he can't do it”. Just because he had no idea as to how to deal with an undefinable ontology can not be taken as proof that it can not be dealt with. Essentially, modern science has used Kant's assertion to justify abandonment of an objective search for any foundations to science. They merely presume space and time are true facts beyond examination.

I deny that assertion emphatically and hold that anyone who takes such an attitude does a major disservice to the entire field of science.

Just as an aside, there are people out there who spend the majority of their waking hours expressing themselves via computer created documents on a daily basis (i.e., they create computer representations of their thoughts which are posted to the world wide web) and yet these same people will insist to me that there are things which cannot be expressed with numbers. Exactly what do they think these computer representations are?

Have fun -- Dick

[Turtle]

Originally Posted by Doctordick

...I have come to the conclusion that we owe this massive lack of interest to the great work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). ...
Have fun -- Dick

Gotta love anything massive for sure. Exactly how do you see Kant's work making this influence? That is to say, what particulars of the distribution of his philosophy can you point to from then to now, that show a progression of influence? Do the scientists you find fault with make their decisions because they have read Kant, or because his philosophy is implied during their education perhaps? What is the mechanism for the massive lack of interest; or, is there no mechanism?

[Overdog]

I think you make a profound point, Doctordick. I'm not sure how and when I came to accept Time and Space as given truths beyond examination, but somewhere along the way it seems I did. I have spent a significant part of my life examining my beliefs, trying to sort out which ones are rationally justifiable, which ones are not, and which ones I take on faith...but I never got as far as these two, which I see now lie at the very bottom of the pile....

Thanks for pointing them out to me.

[Overdog]

While discussing this topic with my wife, she made the observation that children are a source of some of the best philosophical thinking...something that would have never occured to me.

I thought it was a pretty insightful remark, and wanted to share it.

[Turtle]

Originally Posted by Overdog

While discussing this topic with my wife, she made the observation that children are a source of some of the best philosophical thinking...something that would have never occured to me.

I thought it was a pretty insightful remark, and wanted to share it.

On reading that, I thought of this:

Originally Posted by Plato:Symposium and Phaedrus

There is truth in wine and children.

[Overdog]

Originally Posted by Plato:Symposium and Phaedrus
There is truth in wine and children

It never ceases to amaze me that the ancient greeks, who lived 2000 years ago...!

[Turtle]

Originally Posted by Overdog

It never ceases to amaze me that the ancient greeks, who lived 2000 years ago...!

Indeed. I am further reminded of Homer having Penelope warn her children to behave, else the boogy man would get them. Seems Doctor D has in mind to warn us similarly about serious academic errors. I am all atremble.

[modest]

Originally Posted by Doctordick

I have come to the conclusion that we owe this massive lack of interest to the great work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). To quote from Hywel William's “Cassell's Chronology of World History” (page 334),
The publication essentially asserts that Kant held that, ”anything that lies beyond those categories [which of course are space and time] cannot be described in any meaningful way.” An assertion such as that cannot be defended as his only support is the fact that “he can't do it”. Just because he had no idea as to how to deal with an undefinable ontology can not be taken as proof that it can not be dealt with. Essentially, modern science has used Kant's assertion to justify abandonment of an objective search for any foundations to science. They merely presume space and time are true facts beyond examination.

I agree with Kant that transcendental knowledge is ideal and I think there is a very large distinction between saying something exists or that it is internally consistent and could exist.

The last two sentences in the quote above are not really the case as I understand it. Kant did not assume time and space were “facts beyond examination”. Kant described space and time as things imposed by our minds rather than real "things in themselves" as Newton believed at the time. Kant described them as “forms of intuition” or like a condition of perception rather than a perception itself.

I think an interesting way to look at Kant’s transcendental idealism in terms of Dr. D’s objections is with non-Euclidean geometry. I say this because the only geometry known in Kant’s time was Euclidean and the assumption was widely held that none other existed (nor even the possibility of such a thing existing). If Kant’s method holds the parallel postulate as always logically true then there is perhaps a problem with Kant’s treatment of metaphysics as Doctordick says.

Kant considered the axioms of geometry to be synthetic a priori knowledge. This gives insight because a synthetic claim can be denied without contradiction. Non-Euclidean geometry has since been described and without contradiction so this is not a problem. To say that Euclidean geometry is known a priori means that people understand it intuitively apart from or prior to experience. This is probably true because I cannot picture non-Euclidean geometry. The only way I can imagine such a thing is to project hyperbolic or spherical ‘geometry’ on to my Euclidean way of thinking.

So the question is: was a non-Euclidean geometry at the time of Kant a metaphysical thing and would he have considered impossible any other geometry? I don’t think he would have considered it impossible. He certainly would have agreed there could be a description of an internally consistent geometry based on something other than Euclid’s axioms. But saying it’s a real part of the universe is different.

Kant’s usual approach was with an antinomy which does give the impression that things cannot be known. Some of the antinomies he makes I do disagree with such as a finite vs. infinite universe. As doctorDick says: it is possible to probe such questions. They are not unknowable as Kant’s antinomies attempt to show they are.

Good thread Dr. D.

~modest

[Doctordick]

Originally Posted by Turtle

Exactly how do you see Kant's work making this influence? That is to say, what particulars of the distribution of his philosophy can you point to from then to now, that show a progression of influence?

Not really. I am merely quoting an observation made in “Cassell's Chronology of World History” that I happened across a while ago. Being trained as a physicist, it is quite clear to me that physics certainly does take space and time as fundamental elements of reality. The further observation that philosophers spend little time considering this issue seems to me to make the seemingly unimportant concession,

“ They also equip us to understand the world, for those categories are basic to natural order as well as being the organizing principals of our minds, linking ourselves with the world we inhabit.

, much more significant: i.e., the philosophers seem also to have taken space and time as fundamental elements of reality. I sort of have the feeling that they have bowed to the overwhelming success of physics here; most people seem to think that, if one is dealing with hard facts, one is dealing with one of the hard sciences. I think, if you examine my work, you will find that I am dealing with hard facts which are not at all considered by any “hard science”.

Originally Posted by Turtle

What is the mechanism for the massive lack of interest; or, is there no mechanism?

They simply do not know how to approach the subject so they don't think about it.

Originally Posted by Overdog

While discussing this topic with my wife, she made the observation that children are a source of some of the best philosophical thinking...something that would have never occured to me.

I thought it was a pretty insightful remark, and wanted to share it.

I am reminded of a post I made on physicsforums.com some years ago concerning the social value of ambiguity in the English language.

One of the excellent consequences of preventing communication is the fact that it is impossible to communicate beliefs from one generation to another. Misunderstandings will invariably occur and, in an attempt to make sense of what they think the previous generation is saying, new unique perspectives will arise. Without that ambiguity I suspect intellectual advancement would soon cease.

You can read the entire post here.

Modest, I appreciate your post; however, it brings up another issue often not considered in academic circles. That would be the issue of non-Euclidean geometry. As I have said a number of times, my definition of mathematics is that it is the invention and examination of self consistent systems. As such not one iota of it is “known a priori”; rather, people simply do not have a good explanation as to how it came to be (quite a different matter. Under my definition, non-Euclidean geometry is as much a valid mathematical construct as is Euclidean geometry; however, there is a subtle difference ignored by most everyone.

Actually, I like Poincaré's position that "One geometry can not be more true than another; it can only be more convenient." A geometry is a way of laying out information; the coordinates are expressions of the information being represented. One of the important issues in an objective geometry (objective meaning that no assumptions about the information have been made) is that the coordinates should be orthogonal to one another: i.e., changing one coordinate should not force a change in another coordinate. You should see how this requirement introduces both the concept of straight lines and the idea of lines being parallel. In most non-Euclidean geometries this issue of orthogonality is seen as a local issue.

In essence, what I am getting at here is the fact that any specific non-Euclidean geometry has taken it as understood that there is some specific relationship between coordinates: i.e., the coordinates are not independent variables. For example, in spherical geometry, when the radius is changed, so also are distances expressed via the angular coordinates. What is actually going on here is that these relationships are additional constraints imposed on the geometry. In the final analysis, as far as I am aware, all constructs in any non-Euclidean geometries can be re-expressed in a higher dimensional Euclidean geometry.

This is one of the difficulties I have with string theory. I have heard string theory described as having “curled up dimensions” somewhat like long straws. In my mind, one needs some reason why these “vibrations” are constrained to these specialized dimensions. But maybe I am jumping to conclusions and there are good reasons for this particular geometry being “more convenient”.

Have fun – Dick

[djsee4]

If the universe is expanding space and time are not constant and we expect our schools of thought to be adaptive to this factor. Atomic time records calender flaws that we expect leap years to fix. This is recognized in the Gregorian Calendar. What I struggle to understand is this: How does one celebrate b-days if they are born on February 29th during a leap year? I'm sure there is a rational explanation I cannot seem to wrap my peanut around right now with all kinds of metaphysical and cultural explanations. I can't wait to hear! ..Perhaps in my edit I might venture to say the topic of Easter will arise in upcoming bravado. I might not be one to check back.