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Originally Posted by cwes99_03
... but largely I can always find flaws with either the ideas or their execution.
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"Always" is a pretty extensive base position.

If you think you can, I would very much appreciate your finding the flaws in my presentation.
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Originally Posted by cwes99_03
I see your point on the differences of what I'll call step by step logic and gut logic. Step by step is what we each do when a totally new problem is presented to us. Gut logic is what we do when a situation similar but not identical to a problem we have already faced is presented to us, and we react as if it were identical to a previous problem.
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Your use of the phrase "gut logic" implies to me that you did not understand the thrust of my introduction of that dichotomy: "squirrel" vs "logical" as adjectives.
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Originally Posted by cwes99_03
If it were possible to sit down and do step logic type reasoning with every problem then we would do it. However the world keeps moving on, so we don't take that time with every decision.
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You have missed the point.

One cannot do step logic type reasoning with every problem for reasons much more basic than the ones you give. The fundamental problem is that "step by step" logic requires that one be aware of both ends of a step before the decision that the step is logical can be made. There are many problems where the required information far exceeds what we can be aware of. Secondly, any logical argument depends upon axioms which can not be logically proved to be valid (if you ever come up with a proof, that proof itself is dependent upon unproved axioms – and you are in Kriminal99's infinite regress).
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Originally Posted by cwes99_03
I do propose though a third type of logical reasoning. This would not be gut logic, but instead trained logic. This type of logic says, I've done this exact thing before, and I know what steps of logic are behind it, so I just do it.
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Logic is logic! You are missing the point that there is another way of reaching a conclusion which simply is not via logic.
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Originally Posted by cwes99_03
... but again falling into the lillies.
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Then you should understand why I came up with the adjective "squirrel" for the phenomena I wished to separate off. It has occurred to me that you have missed another subtle side point. It is often quite possible to transform some aspect of a "squirrel" conclusion into a "logical" conclusion by applying logic to some segment of that process; however, after that is done,
that particular portion is no longer a "squirrel" conclusion.
The central purpose of science is to transform everything into "logical" conclusions; however, the point I am trying to bring home is that there is always a basis of "squirrel" conclusions upon which that result is dependent. Survival is possible with "squirrel" thought alone but, though "logical" thought is a powerful tool, it cannot even exist in the absence of "squirrel" conclusions.
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Originally Posted by Qfwfq
I wasn't meaning to be rude Dick.
We ran into a serious problem with the main customer here and it caused a lot of tension when things had already been getting tight. Sorry but I couldn't reply to your previous post and I couldn't even print it. I find the things you say interesting but I'll need a spot of time to read that post. I won't be posting much these days but I'll have a look at that post.
I'm glad you're comparing your thoughts with those of Popper, what I really meant to point out is that, if philosophers have rejected publishing your ideas by saying it isn't philosophy, perhaps you could show them they're wrong, regardless of how much you agree with Popper and other epistemologists. I was hoping to point out more exactly some parts of C&R for you, anyway it's mostly in the later parts of the first half. If nothing else, he uses math a lot and I doubt other philosophers ever told him it isn't philosophy.
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I sincerely apologize to you.

As I have said a number of times, I have great difficulty finding anyone sufficiently thoughtful to think seriously about what I say with enough education to follow what is to come and, when I lose someone like you, I get a little depressed.

Philosophers tend to get side tracked along the same lines Kriminal99 does. Even popper refers to "metaphysics" as "pseudoscience" implying he doesn't think the subject can be approached scientifically. On the other hand, in deference to him, I intend to make use of the term "reliable" as being a rational and meaningful measure of the value of an explanation. I look forward to hearing critical comments from you.
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Originally Posted by Kriminal99
There are a limited supply of approaches to understanding the world around us, and they have all been explored in basic form within philosophy.
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That's sort of the position that there is not such thing as original thought isn't it?
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Originally Posted by Kriminal99
If you aren't going to claim you have a self explaining truth regarding the world, its probably some form of coherentism (belief sets which contain enough linked information that they seem to relieve any feeling of doubt) which suffers from the problem of not being uniquely capable of explaining events. Or one of those "solutions" like Lehr's solution to global skepticism that really doesn't claim anything but simply motivates acceptance of uncertainty until the uncertainty is removed, which basically doesn't really add anything new to the situation.
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, as a matter of fact it isn't!
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Originally Posted by Kriminal99
The line between science and philosophy may be thin, but most people on this forum have tried to limit it to collecting data from experiments regarding the physical world so it would be less vulnerable to objections than if you included the theorizing aspect of it rather than considering that part of philosophy.
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Doesn't that sort of presume "the physical world" is what they think it is?

If you people would get serious, you would realize that "the past", as perceived by the individual, is the
only knowledge upon which any "theory" can be built as the individual is aware of nothing beyond that. In the final analysis, if you won't admit the possibility you are wrong, how can you refer to your examination as objective?
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Originally Posted by Kriminal99
... your approach is still going to fall into one of the general categories that have already been explored ... What makes me so confident of this?
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Because you utterly lack imagination!
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Originally Posted by Kriminal99
If you claim that your approach "leaves the question open" as in does not deal with uncertainty ...
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"Leaves the question open" means "leaves the question open" and nothing more: i.e. make no deduction which depends on a particular inductive result! This can be done by keeping all your deductions abstract.
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Originally Posted by Doctordick
Nothing!  And my answer is actually quite funny although you couldn't begin to understand without following my thoughts.
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To repeat, you couldn't begin to understand; my mother used to say,"you'll learn a lot more by listening than you ever will by talking", and I think you, for one, need to take that advice seriously.
For the others who take the trouble to read this, I will make an attempt to point out how "squirrel" conclusions can to be taken into account without presuming their validity. First, take another look at my abstract specification of the components of an explanation:
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Originally Posted by Doctordick
To summarize: A is what is to be explained, C is what is known, B is a change in what is known, label-i is a reference to the ith element of B (if the number of elements in B is finite they may be ordered as part of the explanation) and P(B) is a function which yields one's expectations for a specific B if the explanation is to be taken to be valid. Note that I am proposing no "truth" here. What I am proposing is a mechanism for referring to the significant aspects of "an explanation" so that we can talk about that explanation without knowing what it is (to us it is an unknown; that is the central issue of "working in the abstract").
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Notice that the single most important issue in
understanding an explanation is understanding the nature of the elements of
A: i.e., having a clear understanding of the meanings referred to by those labels used to talk about the elements of
A. Now, right here, an objective analysis steps into a somewhat sticky issue which turns out to be one of the most significant aspects of leaving that question of squirrel conclusions open. Meaning of references is the central issue of understanding any language and managing to learn a language is not a solution achieved by logic alone. It is in fact almost a perfect example of the essence of a "squirrel" achievement: knowledge of a language is an inductive conclusion and cannot be proved valid (you should note that misunderstanding abounds).
It follows directly that, if we are serious about maintaining our objectivity, that set
C must include all the information necessary to learn the language within which the explanation is to be expressed: i.e., the true nature of learning an explanation involves learning a language capable of expressing the explanation. The final point on this issue is that symbols (the actual notation used to denote those references called label-i above) are not constrained to be any particular symbols; the issue is a totally open question. Some very significant deductions can be made from this starting point.

For the moment, I will allow the reader to think about that issue a bit; perhaps, with a bit of thought, someone can come up with some interesting logical consequences of the circumstance described.
Meanwhile, I will bring up the final factor central to understanding the problem before us.
C is supposed to represent the known information that the explanation is designed to explain; however, every explanation also includes elements implied by that explanation and presumed to be actual elements of
A though they can not be proved to be so required. These elements also play the role of "known" information (if the explanation is to be seen as 100% reliable). For example, consider the edge of the world in a flat earth world view, the existence of angels in a theory of heaven or the existence of neutrino's in a modern particle physics. Please notice that existence of the neutrino can not be proved in the absence of modern physics theory. Its existence is proved by the requirement that the modern theory of physical reality be correct: conservation of energy, conservation of momentum, conservation of spin, conservation of charge and a number of other complex relationships. Please note that I am not denying the reliability of modern physics, I am merely pointing out that there are serious aspects of the theory which are arrived at inductively and cannot be considered to be absolutely valid.
It is to handle the above circumstance that I introduce a new concept. When a theory is created, the theory itself may require the introduction of elements which are not actual members of the set
A. Though these elements are not true elements of
A they must none the less obey all the rules the theory requires elements of
A to obey (if they don't obey those rules, the theory is clearly unreliable and should be discarded forthwith). On the other hand, when it comes to creating theories, there are very serious differences between the two types of elements. When one creates a theory, that theory must explain elements of
A which appear in
C and no leeway exists as to the need of that part of the explanation. With regard to these other elements (the ones implied by the theory) the creator of the theory has the
freedom to propose or not propose their existence. If proposing their existence makes his theory more reliable (or simplifies the rules of that theory) it behooves him to do so.
The point of the above paragraph is to make it clear that, in examining the abstract nature of an explanation, one needs to keep in mind the possibility of two very different components of what is presumed to be known. In order to make these two components easy to refer to, I will call those elements which are actually part of
A "knowable data" in the sense that they must exist in every possible reliable theory of
A. I will call those elements which are created by the theory "unknowable data" in the sense that it is possible that there exists a reliable theory which does not require them. Notice that I am requiring the rules of any reliable theory to apply as well to that "unknowable data" as to the "knowable data" so that no experimental mechanism (consistent with that reliable theory) can differentiate between them. This difference exists only in the abstract representation of
C in that
we are free to change one but not the other in our abstract analysis of all possible theories.
I know that the import of "unknowable data" is hard to comprehend and I hope you all take the time to consider it carefully as it has some profound logical consequences.
Have fun -- Dick
Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity