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Originally Posted by modest
No. Change is how humans think of movement. There is no physics definition of change. If you want to think that change is something fundamental that's happening in our universe then that's fine. But from a physics standpoint it is properly understood as movement.
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Physics is different from ontology. I think you are missing slightly the topic of this discussion when you bring in absolutely standard definitions of standard physics models. The discussion is about what is reality like; what is it that makes those physics models valid. Validity of a model means here that it produces correct predictions. The same observable predictions can always be achieved through different assumptions about unobservable reality (and different classification of the observable reality). But you keep insisting "time" is fundamental because you see it in our physics definitions. Other people are discussing what is it in our knowledge that allowed us to define something like "time" in our physics models.
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Nothing can change without movement
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Likewise, nothing can move without change. That is what ldSoftwareSteve was saying. The idea being that things change in our experience, and therefore a definition of time is sensical and can yield (together with identifying "objects") a valid predictive model of reality.
Note that when the sensory data, that is to be interpreted, is changing, you still need to assume that at least some patterns are referring to the "same" element from one moment to the next (=identify "objects"), before the concept of "motion" arises.
If you investigate how reality is, you can't really begin from established concepts; you need to investigate how did those concept come to be. (yes, turns out such investigation is possible, and yields very interesting results)
To the both of you, I would just like to remind that all these three concepts, "time", "motion" and "change", are something we understand against our conception of reality. Whichever you wish to see as fundamental depends on your perspective, or from what angle you happen to be discussing about reality.
That is, it is not really invalid when Modest says "time" is required by the physics models and without it motion could not be described. It is required by the physics models, but that does not mean reality works that way. You can take "motion" or "change" as fundamental (=without cause) property of reality, albeit you are not really able to defend this (and why that is so, should be pretty clear if you think about how we conceive anything in reality)
Likewise, it is not really invalid when ldSoftwareSteve says "change" gives rise to the definitions of "motion" and "time", when you talk about how do we come about perceiving reality the way we do.
You guys see how you are talking slightly next to each others?
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Please give me a precise definition of change that is more fundamental.
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Like I mentioned before, the definitions of DD's epistemological analysis have got "changes" (to the undefined data) underlying concepts like "motion" and "time". But that is not an assertion about reality; it is just an assertion about our knowledge; We cannot really investigate objectively what is the underlying cause of the changes in that data, as we can only investigate that matter through the model we have built according to that data. It is important to note the word "model", because in that data by itself there are not explicit "objects" that "move".
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Well said. It doesn't matter how beautiful your description of reality is. If it doesn't make useful predictions of the future it's worthless.
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Yeah exactly, but also other way around, it doesn't really matter how ugly your description of reality is; if it makes correct predictions for the future it is valid. I have hard time understanding why some physicist comment that string theory, since it seems to have only unobservable properties differing from older physics models, is merely a philosophical bastardization of those old models. That implies that those physicist believe the old models somehow have ontological truth to them more than string theory.
Well, both models yield same predictions; it would be far more objective to see them both as equally valid; I really don't see how either one could somehow be closer to ontological reality than the other if they really do yield exactly the same observable predictions. I see the arguments for and against equally valid models as the same as people arguing whether everything moves by invisible fairies carrying them or is it rather invisible elves. Neither can be said to be ontologically valid apart from simply believing so.
(Note btw how the definitions of string theory are also suddenly seen as ontologically real... "Reality has got 11 dimensions" etc... Ehh.... that's part of the definitions of the model, it means it is valid to model reality with such and such number of dimensions, but it doesn't mean suddently that is somehow ontologically valid. Who defined reality before we did? God? Don't think so)
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I will outline this for people who don't see where I'm coming from.
Change is a human concept that describes movement. I can say this confidently because there is no example of change that didn't require movement.
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That is also semantics. One can conceive a situation where one particle disappears and another appears. Is that better described as "movement" or "change"? And who cares? More interesting is that you can also say quite confidently that there's no example of movement that didn't require change. Just, in a nutshell, we are not talking about how specific concepts are defined in specific physics models, but how do we come about defining any concepts at all, in ANY possible valid models.
It could be you don't see it reasonable at all to investigate epistemological issues behind our valid models, but I think it is reasonable already for the reason that it forces you to think about your models more objectively. It is like General Semantics in that it forces you to perform some mental hygiene; it forces you to classify certain features of your reality as semantical of nature, and certain features as objective logic. It makes you less prone to make arguments that are purely based on belief. You need belief in your everyday conception of reality, but not in your assertions about how reality is or what is "fundamental" (whatever "fundamental" means)
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Time and space are the fundamental dimensions that describe our world.
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...it makes you less prone to make assertions like this. For someone coming into this discussion and not knowing you are referring to standard physics models rather than ontological reality when you say that, they would immediately assume you think that time is an ontological dimension, like a static canvas where future and past exists all the time and that you assume only your consciousness moves through that time.
I doubt you see things that way, I can only assume you don't see ontological considerations of spacetime as reasonable at all? Since you know it is called Minkowski spacetime, I assume you also know that Einstein was not thinking in terms of spacetime at all when he put out the first papers of Special Relativity. That interpretation arose later. Have you thought what other interpretations are possible? Did you read the "An unorthodox view on relativity" thread? It would be interesting to hear what you think about it. (I think I have provided enough material about ontological perspective of this for you to understand that predictionwise validity of relativity is not questioned at all)
http://hypography.com/forums/philoso...elativity.html
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Are we rebuilding science from the ground up because you like the word "change" better than "movement" or "movement" better than "time"?
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Absolutely not. Physics is different from ontology and they should not be confused with each others. Valid model makes correct predictions
in terms of things have been defined by them
Look at the definition of "Ontology" and the paragraph following it at the post #272:
What can we know of reality?
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Originally Posted by modest
No axiom can be proven with direct observation. That doesn’t mean we should assume all axioms are false.
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No, but objectively thinking, we should not assume any ontological reality to them either. An axiom is "true" within the model itself; it can be part of a valid (=makes correct predictions) and
self-coherent worldview.
(I'm just jumping in here because it is clear you are dismissing many arguments by forgetting the difference between ontology and valid models)
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What I'm saying is that we can know something is real without touching it. You can't look at gravity under the microscope, but that doesn't imply that gravity is just a concept in the human mind.
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Gravity is a good example because there exist many valid ways to model it and those valid ways can be interpreted ontologically differently. Objectively thinking, we should not make any assumptions as to the ontological reality behind the phenomenon we call "gravity". In that sense it is in fact somewhat wrong to say "gravity is ontologically real", since it is possible to model reality without ever invoking the idea of "gravity" as anything
by itself; in general relativity for example, it is just a side effect of how "matter" and "spacetime" interact. i.e. just a name for some pattern we see.
I should mention also that seeing something "under the microscope" doesn't yield its ontological reality because we see reality the way we conceive it in our minds.
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This is the philosophy of George Berkeley or Ernst Mach and in my opinion, it shouldn't be a stumbling block to understanding the universe and how it works.
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And it isn't. In my opinion it is only helpful. Mental hygiene.
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Sure, the map isn't the territory and Mankowski spacetime only describes this real thing - it isn't the thing in and of itself. Nevertheless, being about to model something with such precision goes a long way toward understanding what it is.
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This also implies you are confusing ontology and physical models. What we have is a model that predicts the future of some data. The explicit meaning of that data is not known, as the predictive model includes many arbitrary choices. That map not being the territory means exactly that; The map is a (valid) conception of the terrain.
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Can someone why says time is just a human concept do that? Can they properly model the universe and its workings? No.
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Nor are they trying to do that. Physics is different from ontology. The realization is that we are
absolutey required to create mental concepts in order to conceive reality at all. That is why there's a concept of "noumena", it refers to reality before it has been classifyed as "anything" by any predictive model, and one cannot make any predictions about such form (nor can such a form be conceived mentally, because mental conception is those concepts that have been created about the data)
Trust me, it is helpful to understand that distinction. Plus, suddenly reality seems
even far more beautiful than how you first conceived it
-Anssi