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Originally Posted by modest
When solving a problem of special relativity you see how the present instant is a construct or confluence of things. It's an extrapolation of ideas - not so much something that's real in and of itself. I would think you'd agree with this
If you're looking for a way to disprove or maybe question relativity, this is not a good way to go about it. The present instant is completely unobservable. There is nothing conceptually that prevents two people from having different present instants - even if they are not spatially separated. It is easily implied by relativity that it is necessary for them to have different present instants.
As it's conceptually possible and impossible to disprove with observation - it's not a good way to attack the theory.
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I'm not looking to disprove or attack relativity as far as its predictionwise validity goes, I think I've mentioned this a few times.
The reason I've brought up relative simultaneity was to make people (some who were not familiar with that concept), to think about it from the ontological perspective, and realize that there are many ways to view relativity. To realize that one of the most common views - Minkowski's static spacetime - can't be objectively defended as valid ontological interpretation.
Seems like a good way to make people think of that issue is to make them imagine what does the world look like around them before they see it, according to relativity. That forces you to think because it is not a straightforward issue.
Unfortunately that often gets interpreted as if I'm trying to point out a logical flaw in relativity. If you look at post #408 where I brought up relativistic simultaneity, you can see how I just comment on how it caused people to interpret relativity in terms of static spacetime, and how it is not really necessary to interpret things that way.
i.e. when I refer to the possibility of understanding reality in terms of absolute simultaneity, I am not advancing any new theory. I am just talking about a different way to plot/understand the exact same information.
And the point of all that was to relax some assumptions people almost always make in their mind regarding the relationship between ontological reality and the way they understand reality. To make people look at their worldviews in terms of defined entities, whose ontological existence is unknown (including spacetime). So that it would be easier to comprehend that there always exists many different ways to model/communicate the same raw data. And to prepare them better to understand what DD's analysis is about. To understand it can be valid even when it doesn't operate with the components that people believe reality is made of.
(And like I said before, even though DD's analysis does not explicitly give you any answers as to what is reality really like, it does show that many aspects that are usually thought of part of how the universe "just is", are in fact consequences of defining any sort of raw data in a specific way, implying strongly that we are talking about completely imaginary constructs. How much these constructs correspond to actual reality is unknown)
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But, no, I don't think the average expert in relativity would tell you the present instant or a world line or the lorentz factor, or many other things that represent the method of solving a transformation are necessarily ontologically real.
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Nor should they, because it would essentially be an assumption. At the back of their mind they probably make some interpretation, but they don't communicate it if they recognize many interpretations can be made, and they all include some very unintuitive aspects.
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Originally Posted by Overdog
The reason I posted that is because it seems to me the debate is being waged from points of view which are seperated by an epistimological paradigm shift. Perhaps some insight into the philosophical underpinnings of the two perspectives would be helpful.
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Well, we have probably once all been what's called "naive realist", i.e. we tacitly assume world is the way we perceive it. Slowly we come to realize it's not so simple. I suppose that's the first step for a constructivist. I guess the last step is to realize that "to discover something about reality" is to interpret something in some specific way.
I've talked with realists who strongly oppose my view, but when pushed agree that it may be possible that many valid models can always explain the raw data. But they still believe that hidden underneath is reality that really does consist of "fundamental parts", i.e. that one's worldview could perfectly co-incide with the way reality ontologically exists. (As oppose to just being one of all the possible "perfectly aligned representations" of the reality)
Even so, the problem remains that there's no way to tell. To me, such a belief is much like believing there exists particles that do not interact with any things we can observe. I.e. that there are universes that could never be detected. Rather moot belief if you ask me.
Furthermore, what makes that belief rather unreasonable from my perspective (albeit not impossible) is that it seems quite clear, that in order to predict anything, we have to conceive some features of reality as "same object" through time; i.e. to classify some data in terms of "objects" seems to be part of the model construction process. When people discuss "ontologically fundamental entities", I just always wonder "well who defined those things as "entities" before we did?"
That applies to our views on time (and space).
I think understanding DD's analysis would be easier for a constructivist. For example, note the exchange between Modest & DD about "past" and "future". I would like to re-iterate that DD is referring to that "undefined data" all the time. I should clarify this for the benefit of Modest too;
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Originally Posted by Doctordick
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Originally Posted by modest
taken literally "the future is "what we do not know"" means anything we do not know is in our future.
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It appears that you are asserting that there exists things in the past which you do not know, but that idea presumes that you understand reality.
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I.e. we have thus far learned some amount of "raw data", and our worldview "explains it". That explanation fills in certain blanks (we assume certain things have happened because of how we conceive the world). Different explanations are obviously allowed to fill those blanks differently.
When you (modest) say there exists things in the past that you do not know, you are referring to things filled in by your worldview, but not things that exist in the raw data. Whatever you learn about past when you are sitting in a history lecture, is new raw data that is learned exactly there; while sitting in the history lesson. That you are capable of interpreting that data in the form of "account of something that happened in the past", is because you have that worldview which places the data as something referring to your past.
That is very important distinction when you want to analyze epistemological constructs objectively.
-Anssi