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Originally Posted by MySiddhi Reflexivity of Implication (A → A) is not Identity Morphism (idA: A → A) dear.
One deals with implication and the other deals with predication. |
Yes, I understand that. The problem is not the notation and their formal definition, it is your insistence on translating the latter into:
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Originally Posted by MySiddhi idA: A → A “nothing has the property of nothing” Identity Morphism |
...which is claiming the ability to bootstrap by saying that A is a *property* of itself, whereas Identity Morphism is simply the statement that "A is A."
You are the one using the language "is a property of," not me nor any definition of Identity Morphism. Since you are explicit carefully using this clearly unconventional claim concerning the meaning of Identity Morphism, it begs the question of why you do so!
As to whether this particular Tautology (T1) has an impact on your Deduction, well, as far as what you have published in your initial post, T1 is not referenced anywhere else in your proof, and would thus appear on the surface to be redundant.
OTOH, in looking at your mappings and implications of your usage of the terms "nothing" and "something" it appears you are trying to make the distinction between these terms mutually exclusive in T1, however because you have not bothered to address any of my questions concerning them, its unclear how they are relevant.
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Originally Posted by MySiddhi However given the foundational nature of my proof it is more than just a theory (having a model) but also a theorem from which all models have to derive their essence. |
Cool! You'll need to take us through it, and so far you've got so many leaps to go over involving the aforementioned lack of specificity of terminology and its application that its really just gibberish so far.
Its quite apparent that you've had some good book learning on in logic. However you are indeed straying into epistemology, and you'll have to start addressing the concerns expressed so far, because you have integrated them tightly into your "theorem" rather than first trying to prove its abstract validity before then trying to map it onto specific instances of your proposition A.
If you need some help with this, I'd be glad to assist you!
We'll get back to Gödel when we've got enough to work with. For now, let's talk about the nature of "nothing."
Just as we cannot see our faces with our own eyes, is it not inconceivable to expect that we cannot mirror our complete mental structures in the symbols which carry them out?

Buffy